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"[Tihere is a saying in jurisprudence that hard cases make bad law, and
there might well be one in philosophy that artificial cases make bad ethics"
-Henry Shuel
IT WAS NOT SO LONG AGO that many Australian lawyers, human
rights campaigners, and organizations looked aghast when a number
of their counterparts in the United States began debating whether the
regulated use of torture was acceptable in "limited" circumstances.
The surprise and distress induced by this debate was compounded by
two developments in 2004. First, in August the United Kingdom Court
of Appeal ruled that the British government was entitled to rely on
torture evidence in special terrorism cases, provided Britain "neither
procured nor connived at" the torture. 2 Second, it was revealed that
United States military panels reviewing the detention of foreigners as
enemy combatants are allowed to use evidence obtained by torture
when deciding whether to keep them imprisoned at Guantdnamo
Bay.3
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1. Henry Shue, Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLEcrION 57 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
2. See Press Release, Hum. Rts. Watch, U.K: Highest Court to Rule on Torture Evi-
dence (Oct. 14, 2005) available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/10/14/
uk1877.htm.
3. See Michael J. Sniffen, Associated Press, Torture Can Be Used to Detain U.S. Enemies,
Dec. 3, 2004, available at Westlaw AP Online, 12/3/04 APONLINE.
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With Seth Kreimer, we assumed that we would never have to de-
bate whether the dark art of torture could be sanctioned and that
nations that purport to promote human rights would ever attempt to
abolish the absolute proscription against this barbaric practice. 4
However, since two Australian legal academics, Mirko Bagaric
and Julie Clarke, 5 have thrown their support behind Allen Dersho-
witz's 6 legalized warrants proposal, we feel compelled to discuss this
previously undiscussable topic.
Bagaric, Clarke, and other intellectual apologists for torture ob-
ject to its formal prohibition on the grounds that it is "morally un-
sound and pragmatically unworkable."7 By implication, they also
deride advocates of the absolutist position against torture as naive and
idealistic. 8 But, as MacMaster, in a paper examining the damage done
by institutionalized torture in relation to the French in Algiers, points
out, much of the apologists' contribution is itself naive. It is naive not
least because it has been conducted "de nouveau, reinventing the
wheel as it were, without any reference to the huge field of historical,
ethical, philosophical and legal knowledge that exists in relation to
the practice of torture."9 Bagaric and Clarke fit this mold well for they
provide little evidence to support their position and instead offer an
abstract argument that has been much rehearsed and challenged else-
where. In so doing, they ignore much of the theoretical case previ-
ously made against their position and the empirical evidence that
demonstrates official programs of torture often lead to the corrosion
and breakdown of key institutions, such as the military, police, judici-
ary, and government.10
In this Article we analyze Bagaric and Clarke's position, and by
implication Derwshowitz's justification for legalized torture. In so do-
4. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on
Torture in the War on Terrror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 278 (2003).
5. Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circum-
stances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. Rv. 581 (2005).
6. ALAN DERSHOW1TZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RE-
SPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 141 (2002); see also Alan Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility
and Accountability Is Worse than with It, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 326 (2003); Ken Roth & Alan
Dershowitz, Dershowitz: Torture Could Be Justfied, CNN.coM, Mar. 4, 2003, http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2003LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/.
7. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 616.
8. See id.
9. Neil MacMaster, From Algiers to Abu Ghraib, 46 RACE & CLASS 1, 2 (2004).
10. See Jean Maria Arrigo, A Consequentialist Argument Against Torture Interroga-
tion of Terrorists (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://atlas.usafa.af.mil/
jscope/JSCOPE03/Arrigo03.html (2003 Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics)
(last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
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ing we validate the absolute prohibition against torture and the moral
arguments underpinning that proscription.
We begin, in Part I, by highlighting the weakness of Bagaric and
Clarke's article by offering evidence that challenges a number of their
core claims. Part II argues that these advocates fail to consider the full
consequences of the practice of torture and the social decay or break-
down of key democratic institutions which may involve a second order
effect involving the loss of an incalculable number of lives. Finally, in
Part III we apply a game-theoretic critique to the ticking bomb scena-
rio that lies at the core of Bagaric and Clarke's assertion that torture is
"an excellent means of gathering information.""1
I. Bagaric and Clarke Use Flawed Propositions to Justify
Torture
Bagaric and Clarke's demand for legalized torture rests on a
number of flawed propositions. In this section of the Article we high-
light three of their claims that we deem to be particularly weak. First,
they assert that torture is an excellent information gathering device1 2
and should be permissible in certain circumstances, 13 correlating to
the hypothetical ticking bomb scenario.1 4 Second, they declare the
"floodgate" or "slippery slope" argument is unmeritorious as the
floodgates are already open, and legalization would reduce its in-
stance.15 Third, they argue that given torture is widespread, 16 despite
its absolute prohibition, we need to adopt a "more realistic" and dis-
passionate analysis of the propriety of torture to enable authorities to
properly regulate its use. 17
First, Bagaric and Clarke claim that the "main benefit of torture is
that it is an excellent means of gathering information."18 We concede
that in some instances torture may provide accurate and useful infor-
mation, but note that the bulk of historical, medical, legal, and mili-
tary evidence undermines the efficacy of torture as an information
gathering device. According to Mary Strauss, Professor of Law at
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, "studies are replete with examples of
11. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 588.
12. See id. at 588.
13. See id. at 611.
14. See id. at 583.
15. See id. at 615.
16. See id. at 589-96.
17. See id. at 583.
18. Id. at 588.
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false confessions under conditions less egregious than torture. Even
the CIA has come to the conclusion that physical abuse usually is inef-
fective in ferreting out the truth."19 In 2005, Clint Van Zandt, a for-
mer FBI hostage negotiator and now president of Van Zandt
Associates, a risk and threat assessment group, observed of the Abu
Ghraib torture scandal: "[T]he fact is that no 'trial by ordeal,' be it
physical, psychological, or chemical will insure that we can: (1) actu-
ally get information from the detainee, and (2) guarantee that what
ever information extracted is true, a reality with which most interroga-
tion 'experts' will agree."20 Likewise, Professor Michael LaBossiere
states that:
[E]xtensive studies of torture show that it is largely ineffective as a
means of gathering correct information. For example, the Ge-
stapo's use of torture against the French resistance in the 1940s
and the French use of torture against the Algerian resistance in the
1950s both proved largely ineffective. As another example,
Diederik Lohman, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch,
found that the torture of suspected criminals typically yields infor-
mation that is not accurate. A final, and rather famous example is
that of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. Under torture, al-Libi claimed that Al
Qaeda had significant links to Iraq. However, as he himself later
admitted [and we now know to be correct] there were no such
links. Thus, the historical record seems to count against the effec-
tiveness of torture.2 1
In addition to being decidedly less than an "excellent means of
gathering information," the use of torture can actually serve to en-
courage rather than undermine terrorist groups and by strengthening
hatred of the torturers, strengthen the will of victims to resist. As Mac-
Master explains, the use of torture may drive civilians into the political
or social movement that the regime/officials perpetrating this behav-
ior oppose: "[A]s was clear from both Algeria and Vietnam, the de-
ployment of inhumane violence merely served to deepen resistance
and drive most civilians into the arms of the FLN [Front de Liberation
National] or the Vietminh."22 Far from diminishing the power of the
19. Mary Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 201, 261-62 (2004); see also RichardJ.
Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Consequences of False Confession: Deprivations of Liberty and Mis-
carriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429
(1998); Tim Weiner, CIA Taught then Dropped Mental Torture in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 1997, at All.
20. Clint Van Zandt, Commentary, Does Torture Really Work?, MSNBC.coM, June 13,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7516880/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
21. Michael LaBossiere, Provocations: Torture and Terror, TPM ONLINE, PHILOSOPHERS'
MAG., 2004, available at http://www.philosophersnet.com/cafe/archive-article.php?id+
25&name=provocations (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
22. MacMaster, supra note 9, at 12.
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"terrorist" groups, the practice of torture contributed to the growth in
support for these groups.
Second, the slippery slope argument that Bagaric and Clarke dis-
miss with the assertion that capital punishment is limited to a rela-
tively small number of crimes is not underpinned by substantial logic
or empirical evidence. Indeed, they undermine their own case when
they accept the proposition that "[p]eople who are simply aware of
the threatened harm, that is innocent people, may in some circum-
stances also be subjected to torture."23 They move from the Dersho-
witz proposition that torture can be justified in some circumstances to
conceding that witnesses and innocent people may also be tortured.24
This concession essentially undermines their own argument that tor-
ture can be restricted to legitimate, legal, or clinical torture in specific
circumstances. Bagaric and Clarke, have in fact and perhaps unwit-
tingly, given support to the slippery slope argument put forth by the
moral absolutists.
The third claim proffered by Bagaric and Clarke is that as torture
is widespread it is better to adopt a "realistic" rather than moral ap-
proach and regulate the practice, thereby making it more accounta-
ble.25 This is an absurd argument. The mere presence of torture does
not mandate its legality. Brian Walters, Senior Counsel and President
of Liberty Victoria (an Australian equivalent to the ACLU), has
demonstrated the absurdity of this "logic" by observing that the same
argument could be used to justify regulating crime: society could
clean up crime and create more accountability by allowing criminals
to apply for a license to commit their preferred felony within specific
circumstances or conditions specified under license. 26
II. Bagaric and Clarke Do Not Consider the Corrosive
Effects that Torture Has on Broader Social and
Democratic Institutions
A. The Legalization of Torture Presents a Large-Scale Threat to
Society
In this section we argue that the costs of torture are seriously un-
derstated by Bagaric and Clarke and hence their utilitarian, cost-bene-
23. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 612.
24. Id. at 582, 612.
25. Id. at 614-15.
26. Brian Walters SC, President, the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Inc., Speech
for Public Forum, Melbourne, Australia (May 20, 2005).
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fit claim that the gains associated with legalized torture outweigh any
potential loss is without substance.
Much research that has been undertaken by academics in the
fields of law, medicine, psychiatry, and politics demonstrates that
when societies engage in, or legitimize, violent previously abhorred
practices, the changes cannot be isolated and often promote corre-
sponding transformations in other areas.
When violence is institutionalized and normalized, concepts of mo-
rality become increasingly distorted, as units within the repressive
machine begin to compete for deadly goals: higher arrest rates;
uncovering critical intelligence; quick extraction of confessions;
and total annihilation of the enemy. Eventually these actions be-
come not merely corrosive but implosive, as the atrocity environ-
ment turns against itself.2 7
Drawing from the fields of criminology, organizational theory,
historical records, and interviews, Dr. Jean Arrigo, a social psycholo-
gist who engaged in volunteer human rights work in Central America
during the 1980s, examined the institutional dynamics resulting from
the practice of torture. She argues that official programs of torture
interrogation repeatedly lead to serious dysfunctions in major institu-
tions such as health care, biomedical research, police, the judiciary,
the military, and the government. 28 By way of example, Arrigo points
to the unintended consequences of biomedical research on torture
where in the past it has resulted in, or provides, an "opportunity for
secret, illegal research on human beings for other purposes."2 9 That
this is the case not just under authoritarian regimes but in democratic
countries such as the United States was revealed when "government-
sponsored ethics investigations of the CIA's mind-control Project
MKULTRA and the Department of Energy's radiation studies exposed
extraneous, excessive, and criminal human subjects research. 3 0
A further example of torture's long-term impact on institutional
and political structures and individuals is provided by MacMaster's dis-
cussion of the French in Algeria:
The consensus that emerged in France, one accepted by the main
stream Left and centre-Right political parties, as well as by many ex-
soldiers who had served in Algeria, was that the use of torture had
constituted an unspeakable catastrophe. It had irreparably dam-
27. Kara Martinez, Structures of Violence: The Proliferation of Atrocity Environments Under
the Brazilian Military Government and the Bush Administration, 5 HUM. RTs. & HUM. WELFARE
293, 298 (2005).
28. Arrigo, supra note 10, at 2.
29. Id. at 10.
30. Id.
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aged both the victims and the perpetrators. The psychologist
Marie-Odile Godard estimated that some 350,000 French ex-com-
batants still suffer from psychiatric disorders and trauma (insom-
nia, nightmares, hallucinations, flashbacks, depression, suicidal
impulses). Torture, widely referred to as "la gangrend', was seen as a
form of cancer that inexorably led to the degeneration of the lib-
eral democratic state, its institutions (particularly the army and the
judiciary), its core values and fundamental respect for human
rights and dignity. The centrality of torture to the debate on the
Algerian war lay not in the grim horrors of the practice as taken in
isolation, but rather in the extent to which it served as a symbol of
a deeper corruption, both of the state and of the structures of the
military, administrative and judicial power that had made it
possible.3 '
Judicial integrity may also be affected by instituting a legal mecha-
nism of torture warrants. 3 2 Oren Gross argues that "issuing torture
warrants will make judges 'allied with bad acts,' or, at the very least,
appear to be so allied. This will have significant costs in the context of
the public perception of the judicial system [and may result in judges
becoming] 'adjunct law enforcement officers"' 3 3 and mere rubber
stamps for the police or military apparatus.3
4
Gross provides an example by way of an analysis of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). Established in 1978, FISC
meets in secret and is composed of eleven federal district judges who
are authorized to issue ex ante surveillance orders and search war-
rants.3 5 According to Gross, the "combined effect of secrecy and the
courts' general proclivity to defer to the executive in matters of na-
tional security is clearly demonstrated by FISC's record."3 6 Since its
inception the court has approved "all but less than a handful of appli-
cations. T37 A total of 1228 applications were made to the court for
surveillance and physical searches in 2002-all were approved.3 8 Hav-
ing the judiciary act subserviently to the government undermines
31. MacMaster, supra note 9, at 9.
32. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobe-
dience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1540 (2004); see also Robert M. Bloom, Judicial Integrity: A Call
for Its Re-emergence in the Adjudication of Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 462
(1993); Chanterelle Sung, Torturing the Ticking Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanc-
tioned Torture in the Context of Terrorism, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193, 207-09 (2003) (re-
viewing ALArN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORIST WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT,
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002)).
33. Gross, supra note 32, at 1540-41.
34. Id. at 1541.
35. Id. at 1547.
36. Id. at 1547-48.
37. Id. at 1548.
38. Id.
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their independence, a development compounded by the creation of
closed courts-instruments that can all too easily become an appara-
tus of tyranny.
B. Torture Has Devastating Effects on Democracy
In addition to its troubling sociological effects, the acceptance of
torture in principle or practice threatens democracy. Bagaric, Clarke,
and Dershowitz assume that once the genie escapes the bottle, demo-
cratic governance and judicial oversight will be able to regulate its be-
havior. The authors ignore the numerous empirical studies that have
demonstrated this presumption to be false. In countries where torture
has been allowed, a corroding process whereby the practice prolifer-
ates throughout the security and police apparatus has been repeatedly
documented. This has been the case both in democratic countries
such as France that allowed torture in Algeria, and in nations that
limit democracy to a select proportion of the population, as with
Israel in relation to the Palestinians.39
Nor do Bagaric and Clarke address the contradiction and irrec-
oncilability between the philosophical and legal principles underpin-
ning democracy and the practice of torture. Cohen addresses this
contradiction when he notes: "[A]ssuming that the rule of law in a
liberal democratic society is built on the foundation of respect for in-
dividuals and human rights, inserting a legal element that contradicts
those values fractures the internal coherence of the entire con-
struct."40 Similarly, Gross states that "by the mere incorporation of a
39. See generally MacMaster, supra note 9; see also PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET, TORTURE: CAN-
CER OF DEMOCRACY (1963); Sanford Levison, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment". The Ban
on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REv. 2013 (2003); AndrhJacques, Breaking
the Silence on the War in Algeria-The Fight for Truth and Reconciliation, 2 WORLD ASS'N FOR
CHRISTIAN COMM. MEDIA DEV., Apr. 2002, available at http://www.wacc.org.uk/wacc/con-
tent/pdf/669 (last visited Sep. 20, 2005); Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Torture: Implement of Conform-
ity, 14 NATION, June 12, 1972, at 746, 747; Raphaille Branche, The French Army and
Torture During the Algerian War (1954-1962) (Nov. 18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.mfo.ac.uk/uk/publicationsuk/lecturereports-uk/branche-uk.
htm Maison Franais d'Oxford Lecture Rep.) (last visited Aug. 18, 2005); Darius Rejali,
Lecture: Torture, Democracy and the New Discourse of Terror (Jul. 8, 2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://academic.reed.edu/polisci/faculty/rejali/rejali/articles/
TortureDem-Terror/htm (last visited Aug. 18, 2005). In relation to Israel, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL'S RECORD OF OCCUPATION: VIOLATIONS OF CIL AND POLITICAL
RIcTrrs (1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/israel/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2005); Barak
Cohen, Democracy and the Mis-Rule of Law: The Israeli Legal System's Failure to Prevent Torture in
the Occupied Territories, 12 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 75 (2002); Sanford H. Kadish, Torture,
the State and the Individua4 23 ISR. L. REv. 345 (1989).
40. Cohen, supra note 39, at 91.
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set of extraordinary governmental powers into the legal system, a
weakening of that legal system's resolve against using torture will have
already taken place. ' 4 1 Poorly constructed arguments in favor of tor-
ture cannot make torture and democracy compatible. Rather, the fact
that these arguments are considered the subject of reasonable debate
illustrates that democracy itself is in trouble and suggests that we are
entering a dangerous post-liberal or post-democratic phase.
A question that needs to be addressed in this discussion is why is
there now a case for torture? What gave it a serious speaking voice?
The catalyst was the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Since that
time a dangerous hyperbole has insisted that these events changed the
world and demand a new approach to terrorism that can overrule past
principles and practices. Undoubtedly the events of September 11,
2001 were a tragedy of monumental proportions. Nevertheless, this
needs to be put into perspective. The last century witnessed genocide,
beginning in Armenia in 1915, followed by the Holocaust in Nazi Ger-
many, then Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and now Darfur, amongst
others. This period was dominated by repression, torture, and mass
killings in different parts of the world. In many instances the genocide
was ignored by Western governments until the posthumous cries were
so deafening that it could no longer be neglected, but by that time
hundreds of thousands had already been killed. These events cannot
be weighed against each other, and all demand a response from the
global community. That response should not be further repression,
torture, and a retreat from the rule of law, but a serious, rather than
rhetorical, commitment to international law and human rights.
Bagaric and Clarke, and other intellectual apologists who view
the current climate as somehow new, ignore the fact that the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights4 2 and the drafting of other interna-
tional instruments protecting human rights were undertaken in the
aftermath of one of the bloodiest wars in history, World War II.
Amidst the chaos and ruin of that war, left and right were able to join
together in an attempt to ensure that future generations would not
descend into barbarity in times of duress. To continue to argue that
the context is somehow new, and "that our rights were created in the
absence of threats to our community is to misunderstand history."43 It
41. Gross, supra note 32, at 1542.
42. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. DocA/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
43. Mathew Zagor, Terrorism Is No Excuse for Torture, TIMES (Canberra), May 24, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 8155409.
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was precisely because of the horror and malignancy of the war, and
the recognition that the practice of repression, torture, and genocide
that occurs under conditions of hostilities can lead to regimes of bru-
tality, that a commitment was made to institute human rights both
nationally and internationally. 44 What is apparent in the response by
the Bush Administration and those who clamor for the use of torture
is that they have failed to learn the lessons from history, and the con-
sequence of that loss of memory is that they have also "failed to learn
from the profound damage that torture inflicts, not only on the vic-
tims, but also on the individuals and regimes that deploy it. ' 45
Instituting a legal mechanism for torture in a democratic country
cannot be undertaken unless an environment for such measures is
created. One must convince a populace that has been taught that tor-
ture is incompatible with democracy to suddenly inculcate a different
premise. How is this to be accomplished? Ideologies of national secur-
ity must be advanced in which torture is nurtured and justified, creat-
ing an ever-expanding category of enemy others46 -Muslims, human
rights activists, liberals, and critics of government policy and practice.
Concurrently, an atmosphere of fear must be created through which
the values underlying democracy, such as tolerance, pluralism, and
openness can be turned into intolerance, conformity, and suspicion.
"Fear," as Huggins states, "grants legitimacy to torture."47 When the
threat is seen to be "operat[ing] outside civilized law, [it is then] ar-
gued that the response can and must be uncivilized."48 Alongside
these changes "ad-hoc legalism is employed" whereby official execu-
tive-level decisions are made which further legitimize torture. 49 Thus,
the process of the rule of law and democratic governance begins to
breakdown, and other questionable and extralegal practices emerge.
Practices such as the detention of suspects without trial, 50 the non-
44. See id.
45. MacMaster, supra note 9, at 16.
46. Martha K. Huggins, Professor Human Relations, Tulane Univ., Torture 101, Pres-
entation Before American Association for the Advancement of Science 9 (June 28, 2004),
available at http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2004/O625torture-Huggins.pdf.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 7.
50. See United States of America, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT 2005, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/usa-summary-eng (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); Memo-
randum from Timothy H. Edgar, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to Interested Persons, Re-
garding the Indefinite Detention Without Charge of American Citizens as "Enemy
Combatants" (Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/Safeand-
Free.cfm?ID=10673&c=206&Type=s (last visited Sept. 16, 2005); News Release, Hum. Rts.
Watch, United States: Guantinamo Two Years on, U.S. Detentions Undermine the Rule of
[Vol. 40
TORTURE-A RESPONSE
compliance with international law and the Geneva Conventions, 51 the
establishment of military tribunals to avoid judicial review and due
process, the practice of rendition (wherein a suspect can be sent to
nations that allow torture in order to gain information), and denying
suspects the right to access a lawyer, are all embedded within a
broader patriotic cultism.
Indications of the latter trend became manifest in the United
States not long after the September 11 attacks. In this period,
"thousands of individuals were arrested and held without criminal
charges, under a shroud of secrecy. Attorney General John Ashcroft
compromised the Sixth Amendment right to effective legal counsel by
ordering officials to wiretap attorney-client telephone calls without ju-
dicial approval. ' '5 2 This was followed by the establishment of secret
military tribunals to deal with terrorist suspects. Military courts, as
Anthony Pereira explains, differ fundamentally from ordinary civilian
courts in that they have judges who are:
[A]ctive duty-officers and enlisted personnel, temporarily assigned
to the court, who answer to commanding officers who themselves
may have an interest in the outcome of the case being judged. Mili-
tary justice contains a pre-liberal vision of justice that antedates
Montesquieu's separation of powers because it embodies the prin-
ciple that "who commands may judge," and mixes the administra-
tive-disciplinary power of the commander-in-chief with the penal
power. In its very structure, therefore, military justice lacks an im-
portant element that can serve to protect the rights of the accused
in civilian court systems.
53
Military courts are the favored justice mechanism of fascist and
authoritarian military regimes.54 Nazi Germany greatly expanded the
use of military courts,55 as did the Brazilian 5 6 and Chilean5 7 regimes,
who persecuted alleged terrorists and opponents of the government;
Law (Jan. 9, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/us-
dom6917.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2005).
51. See Steven R. Ratner, Crimes of War Project, Rethinking the Geneva Conventions,
Jan. 30 2003, http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/genevaConventions/gc-ratner.html; see
also AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HUMAN DIGNITY DENIED: TORTURE AND Ac-
COUNTABILITY IN THE 'WAR ON TERROR' (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/li-
brary/pdf/AMR511452004ENGLISH/$File/AMR5114504.pdf.
52. James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, 29 HUM. RTS. 8, 8 (2002).
53. Anthony W. Periera, Military Justice Before and After September 11, 9 CONSTELLATIONS,
477, 478 (2002).
54. See id. at 479-80.
55. See id. at 479.
56. See id. at 480.
57. See id.
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by contrast, social democratic governments, such as Sweden, abol-
ished military justice in 1949.58
In addition, the Bush Administration, as is evident in a series of
legal memoranda, deliberately set out to evade international law. One
of the most significant of the legal memos was the opinion written by
the Head of the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), Jay S. Bybee ("By-
bee Memo"), "on the question of whether harsh interrogation tactics
violate United States obligations under the Torture Convention and
its implementing statutes."59 The Bybee Memo concluded:
[T] hat the infliction of pain rises to the level of torture only if the
pain is as severe as that accompanying "death, organ failure, or
serious impairment of body functions";
[T] hat the infliction of psychological pain rises to the level of tor-
ture only if the interrogator specifically intended it to cause "last-
ing ... damage" such as post-traumatic stress disorder;
[T]hat it would be unconstitutional to apply anti-torture laws to
interrogations authorized by the President in the war on terror;
and
[T]hat, "under current circumstances, necessity or self-defense
may justify interrogation methods that violate" the.., prohibition
on torture.
60
The Bybee Memo proved vitally important to Defense Secretary,
Donald Rumsfeld, who later formed a working group on interrogation
techniques. 61 This memorandum helped establish the framework for
torture that resulted in a pantheon of abuses at both GuantAnamo Bay
and Abu Ghraib and in other countries via the practice of rendition.
David Luban concludes that:
Abu Ghraib is the fully predictable image of what a torture culture
looks like. Abu Ghraib is not a few bad apples. It is the apple tree.
And you cannot reasonably expect that interrogators in a torture
culture will be fastidious and well-meaning torturers that the lib-
eral ideology fantasizes. 62
Luban's point is that what happened in Abu Ghraib is not an
aberration. That once torture is sanctioned by a government or re-
gime, Abu Ghraib is the necessary result. In this sense, torture cultures
are not something that occur only in third world military dictatorships
or Middle-Eastern theocracies, but rather can develop within Western
58. Id. at 479-80.
59. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1454
(2005).
60. Id. (quoting Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dept.
of Justice to White House Legal Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
"Bybee Memo"]).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1452.
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democracies once a government places itself outside the dictates of
the prohibition on torture or outside the rule of law.
C. The Legalization of Torture Harms Torturers
In assessing the costs of torture, Bagaric and Clarke pay no atten-
tion to the torturers themselves. 63 Though research has shown this is a
cost that both individuals and society have repeatedly been compelled
to confront. This omission is unacceptable, given the numerous stud-
ies undertaken on the education of a torturer. Many of these stud-
ies-from University of Florida psychologist Molly Harrower's
examination of Nazi war criminals, 64 Stanley Milgram's laboratory ex-
aminations on the willingness of average Americans to administer
electric shocks,65 and Craig Haney, W. Curtis Banks, and Phillip
Zimbardo's simulation of prison life,66 amongst others-come to the
disturbing conclusion that there is nothing inherently evil about tor-
turers. Rather, most people under the right circumstances, and in
obedience to authority, will deliberately inflict pain on others. 67 In
order for the torture to occur, the victim(s), must be defined as the
"other," that is, the victimized must be de-humanized. Edward Peters,
Professor of History at the University of Pennsylvania, states that evi-
dence from official trial records, such as the Greek trials in 1975, indi-
cates that torturers were "recruited from conscript soldiers with family
63. See generally Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5.
64. See generally ERIc A. ZILLMER ET AL., THE QUEST FOR THE NAZI PERSONALITY. A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS (1995) (detailing the results of Ror-
schach reports of Nazi war criminals such as Rudolf Hess, Hermann Goering, Adolph
Eichmann, amongst others, to determine whether a Nazi personality type existed and find-
ing that war criminals did not have psychopathological personalities but in fact exhibited
different personality types, many appearing normal).
65. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIANCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW
(1974). Milgram conducted experiments designed to test how much pain an ordinary per-
son would inflict on another simply because he/she was ordered to do. The results showed
that there was a strong willingness to inflict pain on the command of a person in authority.
Id.
66. Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, & Philip Zimbardo, A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a
Simulated Prison, in NAVAL RESEARCH REVIEWS (1973), available at http://
www.zimbardo.com/zimbardo.html (follow the "Publications" hyperlink; then follow the
"Downloads" hyperlink; then follow the "A Study of Prisoners and Guards in a Simulated
Prison (1973)" hyperlink). This simulation involved the university students playing the role
of guards and prisoners, in just after a week, the students took on characteristics of their
real life counterparts, those playing guards became aggressive and authoritarian, while
those playing prisoners became passive and vulnerable. Id.
67. SeeJanice T. Gibson & Mika Haritos-Fatouros, The Education of a Torturer: There Is a
Cruel Method in the Madness of Teaching People to Torture, Almost Anyone Can Learn It, 20
PSYCHOL. TODAY 50, 58 (1986).
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backgrounds politically sympathetic to the current [political] regime,
or from lower-level police personnel."68 They received "intensive polit-
ical indoctrination" that emphasized the danger to the country consti-
tuted by "communists," "fascists," "terrorists," or "imperialists."69
According to Peters, torture then tends to proliferate throughout the
security and police apparatus:
As legal or other governmental safeguards of civilian rights are re-
laxed, the practice of torture generally spreads from victims
charged with active terrorism or political mischief to other classes
of victims, until the work of the torturer, himself conditioned to
torture anyone at all, may be applied to any victim suspected of any
sort of opposition to the government or indeed of any activities,
such as labour union work or certain kinds of journalism or legal
advocacy, that the government disapproves of. By this stage in his
career, the torturer is hardly in a position to discriminate among
his victims. 70
Luban also highlights studies that support the escalation thesis
that once torture is sanctioned, the torturer cannot be expected to
contain the practice to limited parameters of use. He points to the
work of Mark Osiel, who, in his examination of the Argentinean mili-
tary, reports that initially many torturers had qualms about what they
were doing, "until their priests reassured them that they were fighting
God's fight."71 Likewise, pointing to work undertaken by Simpson and
Bennett, Luban states that by the end of the war, such qualms were
gone: "[H]ardened young officers were placing bets on who could
kidnap the prettiest girl to rape and torture." 72
The torturer and the torture culture cannot be separated. Peters,
discussing Hannah Arendt's study of the Eichmann case 73 notes that
Arendt claimed that "if there was not quite a potential torturer in Ev-
eryman, then there at least was, in the kind of society in which Eich-
mann worked, the possibility that a functionary might be so distanced
68. EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 182 (1985).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 183.
71. Luban, supra note 59, at 1447 (citing MARK J. OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, ORDINARY
EVIL, AND HANNAH ARENDT: CRIMINAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR (2001)).
72. Id. (citingJOHN SIMPSON &JANA BENNETT, THE DISAPPEARED AND THE MOTHERS OF
THE PLAzA: THE STORY OF THE 11,000 ARGENTINIANS WHO VANISHED 109 (1985)).
73. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALrrV OF EVIL
(1963). This case involved Adolf Eichman, a Nazi lieutenant colonel, who was alleged to
have been responsible for transporting Jews to concentration camps, and hence to their
deaths. After World War II he escaped capture by leaving Germany and lived in Argentina
under a false name. In 1969 he was kidnapped by Israeli intelligence and brought to Israel
to face fifteen charges, including crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. See id. at 21.
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from reality that in his detachment he failed to realize the conse-
quences" 74 of his actions. In observing Eichmann during his trial, Ar-
endt concluded that:
Eichmann was not lago and not Macbeth, and nothing would have
been farther from his mind than to determine with Richard III "to
prove a villain." Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking
out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all. And
this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; he certainly would
never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He
merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was
doing.7
5
Arendt's point about Eichmann was the dreadful banality of the
man. According to Bergen, "Arendt's thesis of the banality of evil is in
part a damning critique of the thoughtlessness of modern bureau-
cratic man who follows rules blindly and mechanistically," and in so
doing renounces his "moral autonomy. ' 76 Eichmann is simply a func-
tionary-a cog in the juridical machine-a "law-abiding citizen" of
"frightening mediocrity,"77 who carries out his duties under the law,
under a "legalized warrant." It is difficult to determine which is the
more damaging-the torturer who suffers from depression and sui-
cidal impulses, and perhaps some notion of guilt as a consequence of
inflicting pain on others, or the Eichmanns-functionaries who do
not display any moral ambivalence regarding the harm they inflict.
Both are damaged, and both are damaging to society.
Bagaric and Clarke would probably dismiss their advocacy of le-
galized torture as a long way from Nazi Germany, however as Van Ber-
gen points out, "regulating rather than forbidding a wrong act makes
it seem right, '78 and it expunges the torturer of any sense of guilt or
remorse for their actions. Furthermore, there are numerous psycho-
logical studies of torturers that indicate that the majority of torturers
develop significant psychological impairment as a direct result of their
74. PETERS, supra note 68, at 181.
75. ARENDT, supra note 73 at 287.
76. David B. Levy, Book Note, Hannah Arendt and the Shoah: Banality of Evil? Radical
Evil? OrBoth, H-HOLOCAUST, Aug. 1999, at 2 (reviewing BERNARD J. BERGEN, THE BANALITYr
OF EVIL: HANNAH ARENDT AND "THE FINAL SOLUTION REVIEW" (1998)), available at http://
www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showpdf.cgi?path=18645999013447 (last visited Aug. 17,
2005).
77. Malte Goebel, Book Note (reviewing HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A
REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1998)), http://www.informatik.hu-berlin.de/-goebel/
ha/ha-eich.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2005) (unpublished book review).
78. Jennifer Van Bergen, If They Lie in Public, What Would They Do in Secret? National
Security Courts and Torture Warrants, COUNTERPUNCH, Aug. 20, 2004, available at http://
www.counterpunch.org/bergen08202004.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
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work.79 While many torturers are viewed as serving the interests of
their country, once hostilities end or an authoritarian regime is de-
feated, there are considerable problems reintegrating these men and
women into the social body.80 Professor Wolfgang Heinz, in his study
of the military and torture, found that in United States military his-
tory, members of the Office of Strategic Services who engaged in con-
duct just short of torture "often experienced the contempt of the
regular army." ' Similarly, Arrigo states that "[a]fter the fall of the
Pinochet regime in Chile, the navy and air force did not take back
officers who had worked in the secret service but considered them to
be 'defiled.'" 8 2 If the intellectual apologists are serious about their
torture proposal, then they need to also develop a detailed social and
psychological repair model to deal with the institutional breakdowns
and individual pathologies that are a consequence of the torture cul-
ture they advocate.
Bagaric and Clarke fail to understand that the clinical function-
ary who would dispense torture under ajudicial warrant is the same as
the functionary in Nazi Germany.83 Naively, they assert that a demo-
cratic government can regulate torture without corresponding reac-
tions in other key institutions or in the broader culture-history,
politics, and psychology prove their thesis unambiguously incorrect.
The torture in Abu Ghraib did not occur in a vacuum; it was part and
parcel of other changes in the justice and administrative system that
are in conflict with the rule of law.
1I. The Ticking Bomb
A key element in the case advanced by Bagaric and Clarke is the
ticking bomb thesis. Given the centrality of the ticking bomb to the
demand for legalized torture, in this Part we demonstrate that it is a
less convincing justification than its advocates would have us believe.
79. Arrigo, supra note 10 (citing many of these studies including ALISTAIR HORNE, A
SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954-1962 (1977), which provides details such as the case
of a European police officer found guilty of torturing his wife and children who formerly
conducted torture in Algeria; see also RACHEL M. MAcNAIR, PERPETRATION-INDUCED TRAU-
MATIC STRESS: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KILLING (2002); THE POLITICS OF
PAIN: TORTURERS AND THEIR MASTERS (Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex Peter Schmid eds.,
1994).
80. See MacMaster, supra note 9, at 9.
81. Arrigo, supra note 10, at 30 n.60 (quoting WOLFGANG S. HEINZ, THE MILITARY,
TORTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993)).
82. See id. at 12.
83. Van Bergen, supra note 78.
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The so called "ticking bomb" aims to be seductive in its simplicity.
Bagaric and Clarke state it as:
A terrorist network has activated a large bomb on one of hundreds
of commercial planes carrying over three hundred passengers that
is flying somewhere in the world at any point in time. The bomb is
set to explode in thirty minutes. The leader of the terrorist organi-
zation announces this via a statement on the Internet. He states
that the bomb was planted by one of his colleagues at one of the
major airports in the world in the past few hours. No details are
provided regarding the location of the plane where the bomb is
located. Unbeknown to him, he was under police surveillance and
is immediately apprehended by the police. The terrorist leader ref-
uses to answer any questions of the police, declaring that the pas-
sengers must die and will do so shortly.84
Having detailed a hypothetical replete with many specific implicit
assumptions (such as the ability to verify that the detainee is indeed
the terrorist mastermind, has the requisite information, and would re-
veal said information under the "right" circumstances (i.e., sufficient
force, etc.)), Bagaric and Clarke then implore us: "Who in the world
would deny that all possible means should be used to extract the de-
tails of the plane and the location of the bomb?"85
Falling just short of the "what if it were your child on the plane"
argument, they contend that reasonable people would be willing to
waive any absolute proscription against torture if the circumstance was
of immediate consequence to them. The paucity of academic rigor in
this reasoning is disappointing. That it forms the basis on which the
legal sanctioning of torture in certain circumstances is being seriously
considered by policymakers around the world is alarming.
Having detailed in the first part of this Article the moral and phil-
osophical objections to the state sanctioned use of torture, we now
turn to demonstrating the logical inconsistencies in the seemingly
simple and (self proclaimed) compelling case for torture put forth by
Bagaric and Clarke. To extend earlier refutations of this stratagem, we
engage in a short foray into game-theory. The latter is essentially the
study of strategic behavior amongst agents (whether they are people,
firms, or states).86 In particular, the key insight of the game-theoretic
lens is the observation that there exists a world of strategic interdepen-
84. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 583.
85. Id.
86. There is extensive literature on game-theoretical methods in fields ranging from
evolutionary biology to auction theory. See generally AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND
EVERYDAY LIFE (1991), for a non-technical introduction.
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dence. Thus, the payoffs to any agent (their utility, profits, or
whatever it is that they are seeking to maximize in life) depends not
just on the actions that they take, but also on the actions and reactions
that all the other players in the game undertake (which in turn, will
depend on their objective functions). Thus, in analyzing a game, we
start by trying to identify all the players, what their objective functions
are, and delineate their strategy space (identifying their actions con-
tingent on the actions and reactions of others).
Applying game-theory to Bagaric and Clarke's ticking bomb hy-
pothetical shows many players in this game: the state, the torturer, the
detainee, the innocent victims, etc. This discussion limits its attention
to the state appointed torturer and the person currently in captivity
suspected of having information about the location of the bomb.87
This discussion assumes further that the torturer is only interested in
saving the lives of as many people as possible. 88 The detainee can ei-
ther know the required information, or not.89 First, this Article exam-
ines the case where he has the requisite information. It assumes
further that his objective function is to threaten the global compact,
and the means is by successfully rendering acts of terror on innocent
civilians. Apart from all the assumptions that we have already deline-
ated to this point, the further presumption in the Bagaric and Clarke
hypothesis is that by pursuing torture as part of the interrogation pro-
cess, the detainee will divulge information (accurately) that would not
otherwise be forthcoming.90 Why would we believe this to be true?
Bagaric and Clarke appeal to anecdotal evidence to contend that tor-
ture is "an excellent means of gathering information."91 They appeal
to the observation that: "Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain,
no matter how short term, and most will comply with the demands of
a torturer to avoid the pain."92
87. The game between the State (as representative of the democratic polity) and the
torturer is also interesting but tangential to the main thrust of the Bagaric and Clarke
article. In practice, given the perception that torture may yield information in a torture
warrants game, the torturer weighs the risk of ex post being found derelict in his duty
(legal scholars, commentators, politicians, the public, lamenting the failure to use all
means possible to extract information).
88. Note that this is not the same as wanting to extract information. Extracting infor-
mation is only relevant insofar as it enables the State to save lives.
89. Indeed, in the state of the world where the captor is not privy to the sought after
information, that could either be because he is innocent or just not in possession of the
information.
90. See Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 588.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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But what of our detainee's objective function? Indeed, one might
also conjecture that humans have a desire to avoid death, and yet we
see many instances of terrorists willingly engaging in suicide bombing
missions when their desire to inflict that harm overrides their desire
for self-preservation. How do we know that the same will not hold for
stages of torture? Worse yet, how do we know that the information
that they offer during the stage of torture is in fact correct?9 3 Consider
a detainee whose willingness to inflict harm has been so refined that
he has been trained to (subconsciously) deliver misinformation in the
event of capture. So now the ticking bomb actually works against the
torturer. Having subjected the detainee to many hours of "interroga-
tion" we are delivered information that the armed forces act upon
erroneously. Resources are deployed on a wild goose chase that could
have usefully been engaged in other means of trying to avert the im-
pending disaster, but our faith in the veracity of information gleaned
through our torture methods led us down the wrong path.
Suppose instead that our detainee does not have the requisite
information. Bagaric and Clarke suggest that torture should only be
used against individuals that possess the relevant information, but
they provide little guidance as to how this can be assured. Their sug-
gestion that polygraphs be employed, with the claim that they are ac-
curate 80% of the time, is little comfort 20% of the time when officials
have the wrong person. Those trained in subversive terrorist tactics
are unlikely to succumb easily to polygraphs or truth serum. There-
fore, the probability that the polygraphs are in fact going to deliver
guilty parties is probably well under the stated 80%.
Moreover, consider the case where the detainee is not privy to the
information sought. If they are part of the terrorist network but just
not in possession of the relevant information, then whatever informa-
tion is delivered is either deliberate misinformation (the wild goose
chase again) or the coerced confessions that result from "our intense
desire to avoid pain."94 In either case, the torture regime has exacer-
bated our problem by diverting resources to the wrong areas. If the
detainee is truly an innocent, whose only real connection to the ter-
rorists is that his name is Mohammed, then the torture will either re-
93. Leonard Wantchekon and Andrew Healy posit an explanation around the preva-
lence of torture by modeling the institutional structure (between state, torturer and vic-
tim) as a game of incomplete information. While an interesting analytical exercise, their
crucial assumption that the State has the means to verify the validity of information pro-
vided by the detainee seems unreasonable. See Leonard Wantchekon & Andrew Healy, The
Game of Torture, 43 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 596 (1999).
94. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 588.
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suit in a failure to extract any information, or wrong information that
results from the detainee's desire to avoid pain.
A cursory examination of the incentives, objectives, and informa-
tion sets of the players in the "game of torture" demonstrates that
what Bagaric and Clarke take as patently obvious-that torture isjusti-
fied from a utilitarian perspective in the ticking bomb scenario-is in
fact a very specific case that assumes many unlikely concurrences. We
have to believe that we have the right person, that they have the requi-
site information, that they will deliver that information, if and only if,
they are tortured, that they will deliver it accurately, and that the tor-
turer's motives are just and designed solely to serve the common
good. In the event that any of those assumptions proves false, the tor-
ture regime will in fact exacerbate the immediate problem by misdi-
recting resources based on misinformation.
Bagaric and Clarke positing that torture is morally justifiable in
certain circumstances-the ticking bomb scenario-is little more than
a rehashing of the old utilitarian line that justifies actions that are in
the greater good. Of course the evaluation of the greater good is an
extremely complex task (as many public choice theorists and practi-
tioners have found) when we go beyond counting the number of lives
saved versus those lost.9 5 To bolster their claims they present evidence
of the existence of torture in many regimes around the world today.
Apart from padding out their article, it is not clear exactly how this
relates to the formal sanctioning of torture. The leap from covert tor-
ture operations to legalized torture is a heroic one. It is, moreover, a
leap that will increase the likelihood the torturers will progress father
down the slippery slope than even they may wish to travel. In the tick-
ing bomb scenario, if torturers have the capacity to sanction or di-
rectly engage in torture and choose not to do so because they are not
fully convinced that this will produce a positive outcome for the popu-
lation they run the risk they will be blamed should the hypothetical
bomb explode. Situated in such circumstance, the torturer must ask
himself. shall I torture and have the victim bear the cost or refrain and
carry the risk that I will be punished for having failed to go further
than I believe to be wise?
95. Suppose that torturing the detainee is not yielding the desired result. The State
then allows for the detainee's three-year old child to be tortured in front of the detainee
until the requisite information is obtained. Unfortunately, we made a mistake. It turns out
that the detainee really does not have any information, and the three-year old is "collateral
damage."
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The problem with Bagaric and Clarke's article is that not only can
it be refuted on moral and philosophical grounds (and many learned
scholars have done just that), but in fact it does not even stand up to
scrutiny within the feeble consequentialist fabric that they espouse.
The logical inconsistencies are evident in the presumption of the abil-
ity to achieve the "greater good" through torture. The commentary
proffered above on the shortcoming of their reasoning from a game-
theoretic perspective is only a second tier refutation of their basic the-
sis. In fact, as detailed in Part II of this Article, if one were to encom-
pass the second-order effects to institutions and the decay of the
fundamental democratic principles that all too often necessarily ac-
companies state-sanctioned torture, then consequentialism itself
would suggest that torture could never be for the greater good. We
may save hundreds of lives (assuming the stars are aligned right to
overcome the informational problems detailed above), but that can-
not be for the greater good if we consider the social welfare implica-
tions of the decay of fundamental democratic institutions.9 6
A final point comes from Luban who states that "ticking bomb
stories are built on a set of assumptions that amount to intellectual
fraud. '97 Luban argues there are two rhetorical goals underpinning
the ticking bomb scenario.98 First, the ticking bomb is a trap designed
to get liberals to breach their moral principles, to concede that tor-
ture is acceptable in the ticking bomb scenario, once conceded it is
"gotcha," then the haggling over price begins-how far should we
go?99 Secondly, it attempts to reconcile torture with liberal values
whereby torturers can be viewed in a different light.100 The torturer
becomes "a conscientious public servant, heroic the way that New
York fire-fighters were heroic, willing to do desperate things only be-
cause the plight is so desperate and so many innocent lives are weigh-
ing on the public servant's conscience." 10 1 We should not be tricked
into accepting the ticking bomb scenario because essentially it poses
the wrong question. As Arrigo states:
The moral error in reasoning from in the ticking bomb scenario
arises from weighing the harm to the guilty terrorist against the
harm to the prospective innocent victims. Instead, the harm to in-
nocent terrorist victims should be weighed against the breakdown
96. See discussion supra Part I.
97. Luban, supra note 59, at 1427.
98. Id. at 1440-41.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1441.
101. Id.
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of key social institutions and the state-sponsored torture of many
innocents. 102
The apologists can only raise the ticking bomb problem because they
choose to ignore the historical, medical, psychological, and legal
knowledge discussed in this Article.
Conclusion
In their conclusion, Bagaric and Clarke state that "[t]here is a
need for measured discussion regarding the merits of torture as an
information gathering device.' 03 We believe that because Bagaric and
Clarke do not consider arguments disproving the efficacy of torture or
provide evidence demonstrating the broader effects torture has on de-
mocracy and society, they have failed to meet their own objective.
They fail, moreover, because they wish to debate whether an unspeak-
able act, abolished in Britain in 1772,104 should be deemed acceptable
in the modem world. We make no apologies for maintaining our sup-
port for the absolutist position. There is no case for a democracy to
establish a legal framework to suit the often used but misguided tick-
ing bomb hypothetical. The claim that those who advocate torture
would go no further than is suggested by this imaginary scenario is not
only without substance, but it has been shown to be so in the time
since Bagaric and Clarke presumably drafted their contribution. In
short, neither the United Kingdom Court of Appeal's decision al-
lowing evidence derived by torture nor the United States military
panel's decision to embrace a similar position, limit the use of torture
to the unlikely scenario depicted in the ticking bomb example. These
decisions are already past the point in the slope that Bagaric and
Clarke insist can be maintained should we embrace that which legisla-
tors and jurists who were only just leaving feudalism deemed
unacceptable.
There is already a legal framework in place, one established in
response to past atrocities, namely the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, which states that the prohibition against torture is absolute
and applies in times of peace and war. 10 5 The international human
102. Arrigo, supra note 10, at 21.
103. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 616.
104. See Martin Bright, The Politics Column-Martin Bright Finds Torture Is Now Tolerable,
NEW STATESMAN, Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/200510240003.
105. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, pt. I, art. 2(2), adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
24841 114 ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
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rights conventions are neither "morally unsound"10 6 or "pragmatically
unworkable"; 10 7 political expediency and lack of commitment are the
things that obstruct real compliance with human rights instruments.
Instead of looking backwards to the Inquisition-the rack and the
screw, nails under fingernails-for inspiration, we need to affirm the
values that underpin the human rights instruments and need to en-
sure that in combating terrorism we do not undermine democracy,
the rule of law, or the integrity of our judicial system. In Bagaric's view
the "belief that torture is always wrong is . . . misguided and sympto-
matic of the alarmist and reflexive responses typically emanating from
social commentators." 10 8 But as Zagor responds, our visceral reaction
against "the proposition that torture should be legalised
should.., not be considered as mere ill-informed populism. It reflects
deeply seated values and legal rules, an emotional intelligence borne
of historical experience."10 9
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as ajustifi-
cation for torture.").
106. Bagaric & Clarke, supra note 5, at 616.
107. Id.
108. Mirko Bagaric, A Case for Torture, AGE, May 17, 2005, at 13.
109. Zagor, supra note 43.
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